The Price of Victory: Political Triumphs and Judicial
Protection in the Gay Rights Movement
David Schraubt
INTRODUCTION

A widely held conception of the federal courts is that they are
supposed to protect the politically powerless and vulnerable, particularly from state predations. The famous Footnote Four of United States
v Carolene Products Co' first established the principle that courts
should pay special attention to the claims of "discrete and insular minorities."2 This standard has grown to become an important part of the
judiciary's heightened scrutiny analysis-a part that this Comment
argues should be largely abandoned. To be sure, the logic is compelling: heightened scrutiny should be accorded only to groups who cannot protect themselves in the political process. Once they begin flexing
political muscle, courts ought to step aside and let the democratic system take the reins. But this paradigm leaves many minority groups in
a perplexing paradox. Since truly powerless groups do not typically
receive judicial protections, a vulnerable social group must show political power in order to gain the attention of the courts. But, by showing
this power, vulnerable groups simultaneously give the judiciary a doctrinal excuse to reject their claims.
The history of gay rights illustrates the problem. Though courts
can nearly uniformly point to an array of antidiscrimination laws, policies, and principles demonstrating that gays and lesbians possess at
least some political clout, they use this information quite inconsistently. Some cite it as evidence of evolving attitudes toward gays and lesbians, a signal that discriminatory practices are wrong and must be
abandoned. Others showcase it as proof that gays and lesbians are
adequately heard in the democratic arena and thus do not need special judicial protection. But this debate proceeds in the shadow of the
broader history of gay rights litigation-one that unambiguously
shows that without some political influence, gays and lesbians enjoyed
no judicial protection at all. The narrative of judges protecting the
powerless not only enjoys weak historical grounding, but it also allows
t
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unsympathetic judges to justify demanding absolute political powerlessness as a prerequisite for judicial protection, which ensures that
disfavored groups such as gays never receive judicial solicitude.
Drawing on this analysis, this Comment asserts that the Equal
Protection Clause should not focus on the relative political power of
the disfavored group. Fundamentally, the wrong that increased judicial
scrutiny is supposed to rectify is not measured by some baseline
"proper" level of political power. Rather, courts should provide special protection to certain groups to check against prejudicial or stereotyped treatment, demonstrations of animus that ought not be tolerated in a liberal society. The ability to secure passage of a few antidiscrimination provisions, or other high-profile political victories, does
not in itself demonstrate that this prejudice is no longer salient. Focusing on the existence of animus, rather than power, better matches both
the reasoning behind why courts are willing to intervene in the democratic process, as well as the actual mechanics governing when courts
have launched such interventions.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an outline of
the scrutiny-based analysis the Supreme Court and many states apply to
civil rights claims. Courts nominally apply some form of raised scrutiny
(compared to the baseline rational basis test) to classifications disadvantaging certain vulnerable groups. In at least the formal doctrinal
structure of these tests, the relative political power of the group in question, along with a historical analysis of the discrimination it faces, is an
important consideration. Part II briefly sketches the history of the gay
rights legal movement from the late 1960s through Lawrence v Texas.'
Though the judiciary has slowly shown itself more and more willing to
defend gay rights over the past four decades, this has occurred synchronously with increased political influence by gays and lesbians, contrary to the traditional story of judicial protection.
These two Parts lay the groundwork for Part III, which explores
how courts, particularly state courts hearing gay marriage cases, have
determined whether sexual-orientation classifications should receive
heightened scrutiny. The particular focus is on the variable of gay and
lesbian political power. Some states have used the presence of state
antidiscrimination measures as proof that gays and lesbians are sufficiently protected by the political process and do not need special
judicial protection. Others have cited similar laws as indications that
such discrimination is no longer tolerable in an egalitarian society.
Finally, Part IV argues that the inconsistent application of political
power as a relevant variable in triggering heightened scrutiny implies
3
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that it should no longer be an effective precondition for attaining additional judicial protection. The history of the gay rights movement,
as well as other civil rights endeavors, demonstrates not only that political power historically has played little, if any, role in the judiciary's
actual application of heightened scrutiny, but also that judicial bodies
will generally not entertain claims by the politically powerless. Thus,
political power analysis is at best a vestigial factor, and at worst a
mask for hostile decisions by unsympathetic judges. The courts would
be better served to look at the presence and salience of social animus
directed against the group as the primary justification for additional
protective measures.
I. POLITICAL POWER AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE

There are two primary ways courts apply the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect disfavored groups from hostile legislation.
First, some "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" groups are afforded heightened scrutiny, whereby courts look more closely at legislation appearing to target or disadvantage them. Second, courts also demand strong
rationales for legislation that burdens so-called fundamental rights.
Both forms of protection matter for gays and lesbians. For example, a
court might strike down laws prohibiting gay marriage by reasoning
that they discriminate against gays as a class, or that they burden the
fundamental right to marry. This Part outlines the criteria for becoming a suspect or quasi-suspect group or class, or for registering a right
as fundamental. It then proceeds to overview the tests courts apply
when faced with legislation burdening such groups or rights. The upshot is that the relative political influence of a group is, formally
speaking, a disadvantage when seeking to attain suspect classification,
but an advantage when trying to make claims under the ambit of
"fundamental rights." As later sections show, however, this description
of the formal doctrine does not capture the actual history of judicial
behavior with regard to gay rights claimants.
A. Suspect Classes
The criteria for becoming a suspect class, and thus being a candidate for intermediate or strict scrutiny, remain in flux. What is clear is
that on a formal doctrinal level, courts determining whether a given
class ought to receive some form of enhanced scrutiny are supposed to
4
To be sure, if a particularly far-sighted court did wish to provide such protections to the
truly marginalized, this author would have no objection. Given, however, that this sort of judicial
behavior has been historically infrequent, the doctrine should not take powerlessness as a threshold
condition for securing judicial protection. See notes 169-82 and accompanying text.

1440

The University of Chicago Law Review

[77:1437

take account of that group's relative political power. This concern can
be traced to Carolene Products's Footnote Four, which worried that
"discrete and insular minorities" may face "prejudice" tending to "seriously curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities."
The Supreme Court first attempted to lay out a comprehensive
standard for attaining suspect classification in San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez.' Turning back an effort to declare pov-

erty a suspect class, the Court listed the "traditional indicia of suspectness" as including whether the group was "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of politicalpowerlessness as to command

extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."'

Three years later, in MassachusettsBoard of Retirement v Murgia,8 the

Court added an additional factor to the Rodriguez list: whether the
group members have been "subjected to unique disabilities on the
basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities [to contribute meaningfully to society]."'Another case, Lyng v
Castillo,"o indicated that the courts should also consider whether the
group members possess "obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group.""
Finally, lurking in the background of this doctrinal analysis is the
plurality opinion in Frontiero v Richardson." When Craig v Boren"

established a new standard of heightened review for sex-based classifications,14 it asserted that Frontiero,and its predecessor, Reed v Reed,"
had already established that the Constitution demanded scrutiny of

304 US at 152-53 n 4.
411 US 1 (1973).
7
Id at 28 (emphasis added).
8 427 US 307 (1976).
9 Id at 313 (declining to recognize age as a suspect classification). See also Frontiero v
Richardson, 411 US 677, 686-87 (1973) (plurality) (asserting that sex-based classifications ought
to receive strict scrutiny because the category "frequently bears no relation to ability to perform
or contribute to society").
5
6

10

477 US 635 (1986).

11 Id at 638 (declining suspect or quasi-suspect review to a classification distinguishing
between close and more distant relatives, disadvantaging the former, because "[als a historical
matter," close relatives "have not been subjected to discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and they are
not a minority or politically powerless").
12 411 US 677 (1973).
13 429 US 190 (1976).
14 See text accompanying notes 47-51.
15 404 US 71 (1971) (striking down an Idaho law granting automatic preference to men
over equally qualified women in the administration of estates).
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sex classifications at some level beyond rational basis review. Because of Frontiero's important role in laying this foundation, it has
been read into the line of cases providing guidance as to which classifications deserve some form of heightened judicial scrutiny." Frontiero, like Lyng, took notice of the immutability of the characteristic in
question as an important part of the heightened scrutiny analysis." It
also took notice of the discrimination women faced in the democratic
process, observing that "women still face pervasive, although at times
more subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job
market and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena.""
In sum, all four of the key cases-Rodriguez, Murgia, Lyng, and

Frontiero-identify a history of discrimination and prejudice, and
some degree of political powerlessness, as factors courts should take
account of when determining whether suspect classification is appropriate. In addition, Murgia and Frontierotook special notice of a particular type of discrimination: that which manifests itself via stereotyping unreflective of the group's true abilities. Meanwhile, Lyng and
Frontiero also addressed the immutability of the characteristic in
question. Teasing out the precise contours of what entitles a group to
additional scrutiny is beyond the scope of this Comment. What matters is that, as a formal doctrinal concern, political power and its counterpart-a history of discrimination and prejudicial treatment-are

important factors to be considered.
B.

Fundamental Rights

Related to, but distinct from, scrutiny-based analysis is the
Court's treatment of so-called "fundamental rights."20 A right does not
necessarily require explicit constitutional articulation in order to attain
See Craig, 429 US at 197-98.
See, for example, Conaway v Deane, 932 A2d 571,606 & n 39 (Md 2007) (citing Frontiero in delineating the "indicia of suspect or quasi-suspect classes that have been used in Supreme
Court cases to determine whether a legislative classification warrants a more exacting constitutional analysis than that provided by rational basis review"); Baehr v Lewin, 852 P2d 44, 66
(Hawaii 1993) ("Of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court cited [in a prior case
determining the scope of Hawaii's equal protection clause,] Frontiero v. Richardson was by far
the most significant.").
18 See Frontiero, 411 US at 686.
16
17

19
20

Id.

In Corfield v Coryell, 6 F Cases 546 (CC ED Pa 1823), Justice Bushrod Washington
discussed those rights he deemed "in their nature, fundamental," including the right of free passage through the states, the right to petition the courts, and the right to obtain property. Id at 551.
Although his discussion was framed with reference to the Privileges and Immunities Clause, US
Const Art IV, § 2, cl 1, the evisceration of this clause in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US
(16 Wall) 36 (1873), pushed fundamental rights jurisprudence into the purview of the Due
Process Clause, US Const Amend XIV, § 1.
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fundamental status.1 Instead, the Court has given two indications of
what qualities a rights claim must possess in order to be considered
fundamental. In Palko v Connecticut,2 the Court described fundamental
rights as those "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"3 while in
Moore v City of East Cleveland,4 fundamental rights were those "deeply

rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."2' Both of these articulations, but particularly the latter, give preference to those rights that
have enjoyed substantial political vibrancy across the nation's history.0
A critical point of contention in fundamental rights analysis is the
27
level of abstraction to apply. So, for example, in Bowers v Hardwick,
the majority of the Court described the question as whether there is a
"constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy.". In
response, Justice Harry Blackmun's dissenting opinion began by stating: "This case is no more about 'a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy' . . . than Stanley v. Georgia was about a fundamen-

tal right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States was about a
fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone booth."29
Similarly, although the right to marry is well established as a fundamental right,o there is sharp disagreement about whether this subsumes gay marriage, or whether gay marriage must separately satisfy
the Palko or Moore tests.

Notably, this blurs the line between the group-based protections
discussed earlier32 and the rights-based analysis addressed here. On the
one hand, if "gay marriage" is a separate right from "marriage," then the
alleged fundamental right itself is group based. So for a group-based
21 See, for example, Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510,536 (1925) (holding unconstitutional a law prohibiting private schooling); Meyer v Nebraska,262 US 390, 402-03 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a law prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language).
22
302 US 319 (1937).
23 Id at 325.
24 431 US 494 (1977).
Id at 503.
25
26
See text accompanying notes 100-03.
27
478 US 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 US at 578 (2003).
28 Id at 191 (upholding a Georgia sodomy statute as constitutional).
29
Id at 199 (Blackmun dissenting) (concluding instead that the case was about "the right to be
left alone"), citing Stanley v Georgia,394 US 557 (1969); Katz v United States,389 US 347 (1967).
30 See Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374,384 (1978) (holding that "the right to marry is part of
the fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause").
Compare Goodridge v Department of Public Health, 798 NE2d 941, 957 (Mass 2003)
31
(analyzing the state's prohibition of gay marriage as in potential conflict with the right to marry)
with Lewis v Harris, 908 A2d 196, 208 (NJ 2006) ("[Tlhe liberty interest at stake is not some
undifferentiated, abstract right to marriage, but rather the right of people of the same sex to
marry. Thus, we are concerned only with the question of whether the right to same-sex marriage
is deeply rooted in this State's history and its people's collective conscience.").
32 See Part I.A.
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right to meet the hurdles posed by Moore or Palko, the group in question must have clearly achieved substantial social integration and influence. On the other hand, fundamental rights analysis is not typically
associated with group-based protections; the default orientation courts
take when addressing such claims is to look at the scrutiny-based analysis outlined above, which looks for vulnerability, not authority.
These two positions operate at cross purposes: scrutiny analysis
tells courts to intervene on behalf of the politically powerless and let
the powerful hash things out in the legislature, while fundamental
rights analysis protects those strong enough to leave an imprint on
America's traditions and moral fiber, excluding more marginal actors.
Ideally, this would result in a seamless web of protection, with fundamental rights analysis picking up where equal protection leaves off.
But the combination works both ways-unsympathetic judges can as
easily deploy each framework's respective rationales for declining protection as they could reach for the reasons to extend it. The result, as
shown in Part III, is a fatal indeterminacy -one that has become quite
apparent as the gay rights movement has progressed.
C.

The Tests

Most legislative classifications reviewed under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause are subject to what is known
as rational basis review." This is the baseline of review-the application of a higher standard is the exception." For legislation to meet this
threshold, the court must find merely that the classification at issue is
"rationally related" to a "legitimate governmental interest."" Moreover, these purposes can be entirely hypothetical -there is no need for
the legislature to show that it actually had any legitimate interest in
mind. Instead, the burden is on the plaintiff to rebut any and all possible
rationales for the challenged legislation.6 Consequently, some have
argued that "[t]his technique of rational basis review can be so deferential as to amount to no review at all. Any statute could survive a
review that freely hypothesizes purpose and does not insist that there
33 See, for example, Minnesota v Clover Leaf Creamery Co, 449 US 456,461 (1981) (applying "the familiar'rational basis' test").
34 See City of New Orleans v Dukes, 427 US 297,303 (1976) ("Unless a classification trammels
fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or
alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only
that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
35 See, for example, Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 631-32 (1996); City of Cleburne v Cle-

burne Living Center, 473 US 432,446 (1985).
3
See, for example, FCC v Beach Communications, 508 US 307, 315 (1993); United States
Railroad Retirement Board v Fritz, 449 US 166, 179 (1980) ("[W]here ... there are plausible

reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end.").
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be any connection in fact between a classification and such a hypothesized purpose.""
In certain special cases, however, courts will employ tests more
stringent than rational basis review. The Supreme Court has developed two levels of increased scrutiny beyond the rational basis test for
certain types of suspect classifications: "strict scrutiny," and "heightened" or "intermediate" scrutiny."
While Carolene Products implied that some form of enhanced
scrutiny would be available to politically marginal groups," strict scrutiny's particular origins lie in Korematsu v United States"-the Japanese internment case. Although the Supreme Court eventually upheld
the confinement of Japanese citizens in relocation camps, the Court
also declared that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of
a single racial group are immediately suspect.... [C]ourts must subject
them to the most rigid scrutiny."41 Today, what is now known as strict
scrutiny applies "when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national
origin. These factors are so seldom relevant to [achieving] any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy- [that] the burdened class
[is] not as worthy or deserving as others."" Furthermore, if a law or
policy burdens a right ranked as fundamental, it is subjected to this
same strict scrutiny.43
Legislation that is targeted under strict scrutiny analysis must be
"narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."" This
is a tremendously difficult hurdle to surmount-placing it on the opposite pole of the highly deferential rational basis review. If rational basis
review virtually never results in judicial invalidation of a democratic
decision," strict scrutiny has famously been labeled "'strict' in theory
and fatal in fact."*
37 Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971
Term through Romer v.Evans, 32 Ind L Rev 357,359 (1999).
38
See United States v Virginia, 518 US 515, 567 (Scalia dissenting) (noting the three extant
equal protection tests: "'rational basis' scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, [and] strict scrutiny").
39 See 304 US at 152-53 n 4.
4o 323 US 214 (1943).
41 Id at 216.
42
Cleburne, 473 US at 440.
43
44

Dukes,427 US at 303.
Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900,904 (1995).

45
See Farrell, 32 Ind L Rev at 357 (cited in note 37) (observing that rational basis invalidations "are sufficiently rare to stand out as unusual, but they do exist").

46 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court:A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv L Rev 1, 8 (1972).

The Supreme Court denies this is the case, Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena, 515 US 200, 237
(1995) (seeking to "dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact"'), but
after Korematsu the Court did not actually uphold a policy under strict scrutiny for another sixty
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Between strict scrutiny and rational basis lies what is known as
"intermediate" or "heightened" scrutiny.4 1 This test was first established and applied to sex classifications in Craig, and sex still remains
its prototypical application. 9 The language of this test has varied
somewhat from case to case,o but its original formulation in Craig
stated that sex-based classifications "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.""

The decision about which level of scrutiny a Fourteenth Amendment claim should receive is intricately connected to the issue of the
relevant group's political power. Officially, judicial scrutiny toward
fundamental rights claims should increase in direct proportion to political power, while in equal protection contexts, the relationship should be
inverted. This disjuncture could result in continuous and comprehensive
coverage, as each element would act to fill the gaps of the other. Unfortunately, as will be explored below, the effect is often quite the opposite.
Few courts are actually willing to protect the politically marginal. Yet
once those groups begin emerging from the fringes of society, judges are
eager to use that fact to justify continued nonintervention.
years, until Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 306, 326-27 (2003) (upholding the University of Michigan's use of race in law school admissions decisions).
47 The doctrine was introduced in Craig, 429 US at 197-99 (striking down an Oklahoma statute
allowing women to buy "near-beer" at age eighteen, but men at age twenty-one); the term "intermediate" itself appears in Justice William Rehnquist's dissent. Id at 218 (Rehnquist dissenting).
48
See id at 197 (majority).The Craig court simply asserted, without explaining, that sex classifications would henceforth receive a higher degree of review than present in the normal rational
basis test. See id. This may be because the law at issue actually discriminated against men, not women, meaning that the normal factors that lead courts to apply higher scrutiny were not in play. See
Rodriguez, 411 US at 28 (identifying "the traditional indicia of suspectness" as the class being "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process"). In Frontiero, when heightened scrutiny for women was first
broached, the linkage to these factors was far more explicit. See text accompanying notes 12-19.
49 Though it has been used in other contexts. See, for example, Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762,
769 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to classifications concerning illegitimate children).
50 See Virginia, 518 US at 531 (stating that the justification for a sex classification measured
under intermediate scrutiny must be "exceedingly persuasive"); Madsen v Women's Health Center,
512 US 753,791 (1994) (Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing
a reformulation of the intermediate scrutiny language as establishing "intermediate-intermediate
scrutiny"). See also Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial

Minimalism, 66 Geo Wash L Rev 298, 301 (1998) (observing that the intermediate scrutiny test and
language have "been particularly vulnerable to manipulation by the Supreme Court").
51 429 US at 197. See also Cleburne, 473 US at 441 (holding that a legislative classification
reviewed under intermediate scrutiny must be "substantially related to a sufficiently important
governmental interest").
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II. THE GAY RIGHTS LEGAL MOVEMENT

Shifting from a general account of the relevant Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine, this Part overviews the recent history and progression of the American gay rights movement, from the early Stonewall riots era, through Bowers v Hardwick,and up to Lawrence v Texas.

History demonstrates that courts largely did not protect the gay and
lesbian community until after it began to gain political momentum.
A. The Stonewall Riots to Bowers
The gay rights movement is widely acknowledged to have begun
in 1969,52 though sporadic efforts at normalizing the status of gays and
lesbians -legally, socially, and medically-had occurred since the turn

of the century." 1969 is notable in the history of gay rights because of
the Stonewall riots-three days of protests sparked by a police raid of
a gay bar in New York." The early efforts of the movement were largely not directed at the courts." Instead, the movement scored its most
important victory by convincing the American Psychiatric Association
to remove homosexuality from its list of mental disorders. 6 An extremely early challenge to laws prohibiting gay marriage was casually
dismissed by the Supreme Court in 1972, indicating that despite (or
because of) its clearly marginal status, the judiciary was unwilling to
adopt a proactive role in protecting the gay and lesbian community.7

52

Joshua Kaplan, Unmasking the Federal Marriage Amendment: The Status of Sexuality, 6

Georgetown J Gender & L 105,123-24 (2005) (noting that "1969 is widely recognized as the beginning of the gay rights movement," which was considered "relatively new to the national agenda").
53

See Patricia A. Cain, Litigatingfor Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 Va L Rev

1551, 1554-79 (1993) (outlining the state of the gay rights movement prior to the Stonewall riots).
These efforts were largely unsuccessful. See, for example, Boutilier v INS, 387 US 118, 119 (1967)
(affirming a policy of blanket immigration exclusion of homosexuals, holding that the INS correctly
deduced congressional intent by treating homosexuals as possessing a "psychopathic personality").
5
See Cain, 79 Va L Rev at 1580 (cited in note 53) (noting that what was "unusual" about
this particular raid was that the patrons "resisted police harassment").
55 Id at 1582.
56 Id.
57 See Baker v Nelson, 409 US 810, 810 (1972). The totality of the Court's opinion was
contained in a single sentence: "Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn. dismissed for want of substantial
federal question." Id. The opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court went into at least a little
more detail on the issue, but could hardly be held up as an exemplar of deep legal analysis. The
court rejected the notion that there was a "fundamental right" to gay marriage, citing, among
other sources, the book of Genesis to show the importance of preserving the traditional family
unit, which did not include gay couples. Baker v Nelson, 191 NW2d 185, 186-87 (Minn 1971). On
the equal protection claim, the court appealed to little more than "common sense" in asserting
that heterosexist restrictions on marriage did not offend the Constitution. Id at 187. It is apparent and notable that both prongs of this analysis relied heavily, if implicitly, on the marginal
nature of gay rights claims at the time.
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In 1985, the gay rights movement seemingly took a major stride
forward when, for the first time, a justice of the Supreme Court indicated that gay individuals may qualify for suspect status. Dissenting
from the denial of certiorari in Rowland v Mad River Local School

District," which concerned a school district's decision to dismiss a bisexual teacher solely on the basis of her disclosure of her sexual orientation, Justice William Brennan wrote:
First, homosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority of
this country's population. Because of the immediate and severe
opprobrium often manifested against homosexuals once so identified publicly, members of this group are particularlypowerless
to pursue their rights openly in the political arena. Moreover, ho-

mosexuals have historically been the object of pernicious and
sustained hostility, and it is fair to say that discrimination against
homosexuals is "likely ... to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather
than ... rationality." State action taken against members of such

groups based simply on their status as members of the group traditionally has been subjected to strict, or at least heightened,
scrutiny by this Court."
Justice Brennan concluded by stating that the rights of gay, lesbian,
and bisexual Americans were "an issue that cannot any longer be ignored."" At that time, there was no question that the prevailing attitude toward gays and lesbians remained "one of strong disapproval,
frequent ostracism, social and legal discrimination, and at times ferocious punishment.""
B.

Bowers v Hardwick

In 1986, one year after Rowland, the court took up Justice Brennan's invitation and decided Bowers v Hardwick, a challenge to a
Georgia statute prohibiting sodomy.62 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and upheld the law.6 In doing so,
470 US 1009 (1985) (denying certiorari).
Id at 1014 (Brennan dissenting from denial of certiorari) (emphasis added).
6o
Id at 1018.
61 Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 291 (Harvard 1992).
62
Although the Georgia law was technically written without regard to the orientation of the
participants, see Bowers, 478 US at 188 n 1, the Court dismissed a claim by two heterosexual plaintiffs, writing that "[t]he only claim properly before the Court ... is Hardwick's challenge to the
Georgia statute as applied to consensual homosexual sodomy. We express no opinion on the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as applied to other acts of sodomy." Id at 188 n 2. Georgia, for its
part, placed an "exclusive stress before this Court on its interest in prosecuting homosexual activity
despite the gender-neutral terms of the statute." Id at 202 n 2 (Blackmun dissenting).
63
Id at 189 (majority).
58

59
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the Court, through Justice Byron White, rejected the claim that its
prior privacy case holdings "extend[] to homosexual sodomy."4 Indeed, the Court thought "it evident that none of the rights announced
in those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional
right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in
this case."6 The prohibition against homosexual conduct, Justice White
argued, has "ancient roots" extending across the nation's history, rendering it a poor candidate for recognition as a fundamental right.6
"Against this background, to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious.""
There is some argument that the Bowers decision may have politically benefited the gay rights movement by sparking its social mobilization." In terms of immediate legal impact, however, it was disastrous. Though Bowers did not itself address whether gays and lesbians
deserved additional class-based scrutiny, lower courts viewed the decision as effectively foreclosing the matter. As the DC Circuit explained
in Padula v Webster:

It would be quite anomolous [sic], on its face, to declare status
defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as
deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause.
More importantly, in all those cases in which the Supreme Court
has accorded suspect or quasi-suspect status to a class, the
Court's holding was predicated on an unarticulated, but necessarily implicit, notion that it is plainly unjustifiable . . . to discrimi-

nate invidiously against the particular class."'
Other circuits agreed." If additional scrutiny is only warranted for groups
who may not be legally discriminated against (a quite plausible claim),
6

Id at 190.
Id at 190-91.
6
Bowers, 478 US at 192. See also id at 192 n 5 (listing sodomy laws in effect as of 1791); id
at 193 n 6 (listing sodomy laws in effect as of 1868).
67 Id at 193, quoting Moore, 431 US at 503; Palko,302 US at 325.
68 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education: Facts and Political Correctness, 80
Va L Rev 185, 188 (1994) ("I think it probable that Bowers was one of the more significant factors in mobilizing today's gay rights movement."). For more on how judicial decisions can mobil65

ize legal losers, see Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004,92 Cal L Rev 959,971

(2004) (conceding that even skeptics about judicial power believe that it has the ability to spark
countermobilization); Mark A. Graber, The Law Professor as a Populist, 34 U Richmond L Rev
373, 403-04 (2000) (arguing that court decisions often aid political mobilization by granting an
issue a national profile).
69 822 F2d 97 (DC Cir 1987).
70
Id at 103.
71 See, for example, Thomasson v Perry, 80 F3d 915, 928 (4th Cir 1996) (arguing that there
cannot be heightened scrutiny toward a group identified by its propensity to engage in proscribable
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then the Supreme Court affirming the states' right to proscribe homosexual conduct essentially precluded status-based protection as well.
The Turning Point: Romer and Lawrence

C.

Transitioning into the 1990s, gay rights litigators began to see
signs that their long string of defeats may have been coming to an end.
In 1993, Hawaii held that restrictions on gay marriage constituted a
sex classification and thus were subject to strict judicial scrutiny.72 Like
Justice Brennan's pronouncement in Rowland, it was a short-lived
victory. The Hawaii legislature immediately passed a law criticizing the
decision and reiterating state policy against allowing gay marriage,"
hoping that it would prompt the state supreme court to revisit its decision.7 Gay marriage opponents, however, were initially defeated on
the legislative floor when they tried to introduce a constitutional
amendment formally overturning the decision." "Alarm bells went off
across the country, and within two weeks"" the United States Congress began considering, and quickly passed, the Defense of Marriage
Act, which established the anti-gay marriage position as federal policy.7 A year later, Hawaii followed suit with its own amendment." In
terms of positive legal protection, gays and lesbians were objectively
worse off than they were before.
Romer v Evans," by contrast, was an unambiguous advance. Several Colorado towns municipalities, including Denver, Boulder, and Aspen, passed ordinances forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.7 These policies mobilized anti-gay forces in the state, who
behavior); Equality Foundation v City of Cincinnati, 54 F3d 261, 266 (6th Cir 1995) ("Since Bow-

ers, every circuit court which has addressed the issue has decreed that homosexuals are entitled
to no special constitutional protection, as either a suspect or a quasi-suspect class, because the
conduct which places them in that class is not constitutionally protected.").
72 Baehr v Lewin, 852 P2d 44, 68 (Hawaii 1993). The court did not strike down the law,
instead remanding it to the lower court to see if it could "overcome the presumption that [the
law] is unconstitutional by demonstrating that it furthers compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights." Id.
73 Hawaii Rev Stat §572-1 (1993 & Supp 1994).
74

See David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai'i Marriage Amendment: Its Origins; Meaning and

Fate, 22 U Hawaii L Rev 19,29 n 36 (2000) (noting that the state court had responded to similar
legislative prompting in the past).
75 Id at 38 ("The failure of the proposed amendment was seen widely as presaging [a victory] for supporters of same-sex marriage.").
76 Id.
77 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub L No 104-199, 110 Stat 2419, 2419 (1996) (establishing
that the federal government would recognize only opposite-sex marriage, and permitting states
to deny recognition to same-sex marriages legally performed in other states).
78 Hawaii Const Art 1, § 23 (granting the legislature the power to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples).
79 517 US 620 (1996).
8o Id at 623-24.
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were successful in securing passage of "Amendment 2."8' Amendment 2

did more than overturn these statutes. Indeed, it established that
neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian
or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or
class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.'
The US Supreme Court invalidated the law. Recalling the familiar
rational basis test-that legislation must be "rationally related" to a
"legitimate" interest"-the Court held that the Colorado law met neither element.w "First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named
group.... Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything
but animus toward the class it affects."" Intriguingly, the court partially
relied upon its observation that the discrimination at issue was "unprecedented in our jurisprudence."8 The Court observed that "discriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional
provision," indicating that had such restrictions been more prevalent,
the law might have survived constitutional scrutiny.
Gay rights opponents noted a change in the air and began justifying the discrimination as a rational response to rising gay political
power. Justice Antonin Scalia, in dissent, characterized Amendment 2
as "a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve
traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful
minority to revise those mores through use of the laws.". Indeed, a
significant portion of Justice Scalia's dissent was dedicated to surveying what he viewed as rising homosexual power in the democratic

Id at 623.
Colo Const Art II, § 30b, declared unconstitutional in Romer, 517 US at 635-36.
83
See text accompanying note 35.
8
See Romer, 517 US at 632 ("Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional
[rational basis] inquiry.").
85 Id.
8
Id at 633.
87 Id, quoting Louisville Gas & Electric Co v Coleman, 277 US 32,37-38 (1928).
88 Romer, 517 US at 636 (Scalia dissenting).
81
8
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arena.9 He noted that Colorado was among the first states to repeal
antisodomy laws, and justified Amendment 2 as an important mechanism for maintaining the "moral and social disapprobation of homosexuality" without the heavy hand of criminal sanction.i The legitimate goal of Amendment 2 was "to counter both the geographic concentration and the disproportionate political power of homosexuals.""
Both trends-the increase in gay political power, and its schizophrenic usage as a rationale to both extend and withhold further protections-continued in 2003 with Lawrence v Texas, which overturned
Bowers and struck down laws prohibiting (homosexual or heterosexual) sodomy as inconsistent with the Due Process Clause.9 It did so in
stark terms: "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not
correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v.
Hardwick should be and now is overruled."93 At least part of the decision was justified on the basis of the changed political fortunes of the
gay rights movement, namely, the successful decriminalization of sodomy in the vast majority of American states.9 Moreover, the bold, moralist language deployed by Justice Anthony Kennedy suggested a new
judicial outlook on the compatibility of continued anti-gay sentiment
with America's liberal tradition. The majority opinion criticized antisodomy laws for the "stigma" they imposed upon gays and lesbians,9
pronounced that Bowers' continued vitality "demeans the lives of homosexual persons,"6 and concluded by citing a moral progression from
a blinded past to a present where society knows antisodomy laws serve
"only to oppress."9
Justice Scalia's Lawrence dissent attempted to preserve the legitimacy of anti-gay discrimination as legitimate state practice, while also
reviving his Romer observations regarding the ability of the gay community to attract the attention of political and social elites. On the former, he argued that anti-gay attitudes still are "mainstream" in American society, with "[m]any Americans" objecting to "persons who openly
engage in homosexual conduct [serving] as partners in their business, as
89
See id at 645-46 (arguing that gays are geographically concentrated, relatively affluent,
and politically mobilized, giving them "political power much greater than their numbers, both
locally and statewide").
9
Idat 645.
91 Id at 647.
92
Lawrence, 539 US at 558.
93
Id.
9
Id at 571-73.
95 Idat 575.
96 Lawrence, 539 US at 575. See also id at 578 ("The State cannot demean [homosexuals'] existence.").
'7 Id at 579.
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scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children's schools, or
as boarders in their home."" "They view this," he wrote, "as protecting
themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be
immoral and destructive," and this belief was reflected in Congress's
general disinclination to prohibit anti-gay discrimination.
With regard to the latter, Justice Scalia cast gays and lesbians as
the beneficiaries of the "homosexual agenda['s]" success in the academic legal community, which aimed to "eliminat[e] the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct."'aG
Moreover, he noted that gays and lesbians had met with some success
in the democratic arena, as evidenced by their ability to secure the
repeal of most states' antisodomy laws.fo Though he seemed to argue
that these victories ought not translate into legal claims,'2 this exists in
at least some tension with his earlier heavy reliance on the fact that
(according to him) a right to engage in sodomy was an "emerging
awareness," rather than one "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and traditions.",o' Presumably, if at some point gay rights became sufficiently entrenched so as to become a clear part of our historical traditions, then fundamental rights analysis could be deployed against any
remaining holdouts.
On one level, Lawrence changed the terms of the judicial debate,
paving the way for the gay marriage decisions explored in Part III.'1o
But it is important to note that, on another level, Lawrence did very
little. As Lawrence was silent on the question of class-based judicial
protection for gays and lesbians, lower courts did not see it as affecting
prior decisions denying heightened scrutiny on the basis of sexual
orientation -even those that relied upon the Bowers-dependent logic
that homosexuality was proscribable conduct.'os Instead, these courts
simply adapted the logic first laid out by the Ninth Circuit in 1990ss that
heightened scrutiny was inappropriate due to the political power of the
98

Id at 602 (Scalia dissenting).

SId at 602-03.
100 Lawrence, 539 US at 602 (Scalia dissenting).
101 Id at 603.
102 See id at 603-04 ("[P]ersuading one's fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing one's
views in absence of democratic majority will is something else.").
103 Id at 598.
104 The first case to successfully strike down a law prohibiting gay marriage, Goodridge v

Department of Public Health, 798 NE2d 941 (Mass 2003), cited Lawrence extensively throughout

the opinion.
105 See Lofton v Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services, 358 F3d 804,818

& n 16 (11th Cir 2004) (citing exclusively pre-Lawrence cases in observing that "all of our sister
circuits that have considered the question have declined to treat homosexuals as a suspect class").
106

See High Tech Gays v Defense Industry Security Clearance Office, 895 F2d 563,574 (9th Cir

1990). This case is discussed in more depth below. See text accompanying notes 136-41.
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gay community -a position echoed in Justice Scalia's dissents. This analytical shift was noted by legal actors on all sides, making the issue of
gay political power a central battlefront in subsequent litigation."
III. GAY POLITICAL POWER AND JUDICIAL PROTECTION

This Part explores the inconsistent treatment of gay political
power in, mostly, state-level gay marriage decisions.' In some states,
noticeable gay political power, as expressed in the passage of antidiscrimination laws and other gay-friendly ordinances, has been cited to
buttress opinions further protecting their rights. These political victories are taken as proof that anti-gay animus is morally intolerable, or,
more concretely, that the state itself can no longer assert in good faith
an interest in subjugating gay and lesbian persons. In other states,
these same victories have been used as rationale for courts to refrain
from intervening in the democratic process. For courts that view political powerlessness as a necessary condition for strict scrutiny, political
triumphs are a signal that gays and lesbians no longer require special
judicial protection.
A. Political and Social Advances Assist in Gaining Further Protections
In many localities, the increased political power demonstrated by
the gay and lesbian community has helped pave the way for enhanced
judicial protection. At some level, of course, this movement can be seen
as simple slippery slope logic.'" This was evident when, shortly after
107 In the federal litigation challenging the legality of Proposition 8, which reversed California's recognition of same-sex marriage, much of the dispute between the parties centered on this

very issue. See, for example, Bob Egelko, Gays Have Political Power,Prop.8 Defense Says, San
Fran Chron Al (Jan 26, 2010); Maura Dolan, Prop. 8 Trial Focuses on Gays' Political Power,
Legal Rights, LA Times A4 (Jan 26, 2010); Susan Ferriss, Professor Testifies at Prop. 8 Trial That
Gays Don't Lack Clout,Sacramento Bee 1A (Jan 26,2010).
108 Of course, at the state level, this inquiry is technically conducted under the individual
state's, not the federal, constitution. By and large the relevant state constitutional provisions
parallel federal guarantees, however, and states rely heavily on federal precedents. See, for example, Varnum v Brien, 763 NW2d 862, 886-88 (Iowa 2009) (noting that the Supreme Court's
articulation of the criteria for suspect status has been the baseline for how many states, including
Iowa, approached the problem with regard to gay rights); Conaway v Deane, 932 A2d 571, 607
(Md 2007) (finding "useful in our analysis those additional criteria used by the Supreme Court in
assessing claims of a new suspect or quasi-suspect classification"). States that do not follow the
federal model are not addressed in this Comment. See, for example, Morrison v Sadler, 821
NE2d 15, 21 (Ind App 2005) ("Unlike federal equal protection analysis, there is no varying or
heightened level of scrutiny based on the nature of the classification or the nature of the right
affected by the legislation.").
109 In terms of legal doctrine, a slippery slope is observable starting from Griswold v Connecticut (which specifically claimed that it would not lead to permitting homosexual conduct).
381 US 479,498-99 (1965) (Goldberg concurring). Griswold, of course, has become the linchpin of
cases establishing legal protections for gays and lesbians. See Lawrence, 539 US at 564 (identifying
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Lawrence, Massachusetts became the first state in the nation to legalize
gay marriage.no The court there explicitly cited legislative protections
accorded to gays and lesbians as part of the rationale for its decision.
Responding to several amici who claimed a "community consensus that
homosexual conduct is immoral," the court cited both statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, as well as prior
judicial pronouncements of gay equality."' Contrary to the claims of the
amici, this demonstrated that "Massachusetts has a strong affirmative
policy of preventing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation."ll 2
That fundamentally political determination by Massachusetts was an
asset, not a liability, for the gay plaintiffs in Goodridge.
Five years later, the California high court followed Massachusetts's lead and struck down its state's prohibition on gay marriage."
In doing so, the court observed that "[t]here can be no question but
that, in recent decades, there has been a fundamental and dramatic
transformation in this state's understanding and legal treatment of gay
individuals and gay couples.""4 Like its Massachusetts brethren, the
California court cited several state ordinances providing protection on
the basis of sexual orientation to demonstrate that "gay individuals
are entitled to the same legal rights and the same respect and dignity
afforded to all other individuals.""' In a particularly bold move, the
court took notice of the state's domestic partnership laws to observe
that "gay individuals are fully capable of entering into the kind of loving and enduring committed relationships that may serve as the foundation of a family and of responsibly caring for and raising children.""
In doing so, the court stated, "California has repudiated past practices
and policies that were based on a once common viewpoint that denigrated the general character and morals of gay individuals."" Like in
Massachusetts, this repudiation, though clearly demonstrative of gay
political power, was considered a reason to extend further protections.
Perhaps the most sophisticated analysis of the issue came from
the first heartland state to legalize gay marriage-Iowa, in 2009.n A
Griswold as "the most pertinent beginning point" of all the statements on the "substantive reach
of liberty under the Due Process Clause"). See also Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and
Slippery Slopes, 33 Hofstra L Rev 1155, 1158-63 (2005) (tracing the development of the slippery
slope toward gay marriage, beginning from Griswold).
110 Goodridge v Departmentof Public Health, 798 NE2d 941, 969-70 (Mass 2003).
11 Id at 967.
112 Id.

113In re MarriageCases, 183 P3d 384,453 (Cal 2008).
114 Id at 428.
115 Id at 428 & n 46.
116 Id at 428 & n 47.
117 Marriage Cases, 183 P3d at 428.
11 See Varnum, 763 NW2d at 906-07.
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unanimous Iowa Supreme Court addressed the political power question on two levels. First, it took the familiar step of citing state ordinances prohibiting discrimination as evidence that sexual orientation
ought to receive heightened scrutiny."' Importantly, it linked this inquiry to a specific part of the Supreme Court's heightened scrutiny
analysis: whether the group is subjected to stereotyping that causes
disabilities unrelated to its members' ability to contribute to society.no
The weight of antidiscrimination ordinances passed by the legislature
"indicated the irrelevancy of sexual orientation" to one's membership
in Iowa's social and political community."'
Iowa also addressed whether these political victories ought to
preclude heightened scrutiny. Rejecting the notion that "absolute political powerlessness" is necessary to trigger heightened scrutiny, the
court observed that such a position was inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's own practice.' The Frontiero court, for example, freely acknowledged that the political power of women had been increasing
dramatically in the course of recommending strict scrutiny.'2 Statutes
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963
"manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications" on
the part of Congress, demonstrating Congress's conclusion "that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious."2 The Iowa court
also noted that "a group's current political powerlessness is not a prerequisite to enhanced judicial protection."'2 It approvingly quoted the
California Supreme Court's decision a year earlier, in which that court
proclaimed: "[I]f a group's current political powerlessness [was] a prerequisite to a characteristic's being considered a constitutionally suspect basis for differential treatment, it would be impossible to justify
the numerous decisions that continue to treat sex, race, and religion as
4

at 890-91.
at 890 ("A second relevant consideration [in deciding whether discrimination based
on a characteristic should be closely scrutinized by courts] is whether the characteristic at issuesexual orientation-is related to the person's ability to contribute to society."). See Murgia, 427
US at 313 (examining whether the plaintiffs had been "subjected to unique disabilities on the
basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities [to contribute meaningfully to society]"); Frontiero,411 US at 686-87 (plurality) (asserting that sex-based classifications
should receive strict scrutiny because sex "frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society"). See also text accompanying notes 8-9.
121 Varnum, 763 NW2d at 891 n 19.
122 Id at 894.
123 411 US at 685-88 & n 17 (taking notice of statutory protections against sex discrimination and observing that women did "not constitute a small and powerless minority").
124 Id at 687, citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)-(c); Equal Pay Act of
1963,29 USC § 206(d).
125 Varnum,763 NW2d at 894.
119 Id
120 Id
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suspect classifications."'" The court finally noted that, whatever political power gays and lesbians possessed, it had proven insufficient to
overturn gay marriage statutes, for at the time of the decision, fortytwo states had laws prohibiting gay marriage and none had allowed
gay marriage without judicial prompting.127
Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court had the opportunity to
address this issue in Lewis v Harris.'2"Unlike the three cases discussed

above, Lewis declined to strike down the state's prohibition on gay
marriage, instead holding only that the state must provide some equal
accommodation to same-sex couples.12 The line of reasoning the court
took in reaching this holding, however, clearly demonstrated the
court's belief that social advancement was a benefit, not a burden, in
obtaining judicial legal protections. The court noted how "[o]ver the
last three decades, through judicial decisions and comprehensive legislative enactments, this State, step by step, has protected gay and lesbian individuals from discrimination on account of their sexual orientation.". Nevertheless, it ruled that the net effect of these gains was
insufficient to show that "a right to same-sex marriage is so deeply
rooted in the traditions, history, and conscience of the people of this
State that it ranks as a fundamental right."' The language it used in
making this determination was telling: "Despite the rich diversity of this
state, the tolerance and goodness of its people, and the many recent
advances made by gays and lesbians toward achieving social acceptance
and equality under the law," the right was still not implanted deeply
enough in New Jersey's soil so as to rank as fundamental." The clear
implication was that, were gays and lesbians to continue pressing forward in attaining recognition of their equal status, the court's decision
might shift.
B.

Gay Political Power Used to Stymie Suspect Classification

Iowa, New Jersey, California, and Massachusetts all increased the
judicial protection of gays and lesbians in tandem with other indicators
of gay and lesbian acceptance. Several states and the federal government,
126 Id, quoting Marriage Cases; 183 P3d at 443. See, for example, Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US
306, 326 (2003) (holding that racial classifications still receive strict scrutiny); United States v
Virginia, 518 US 515, 532-33 (1996) (holding that sex classifications receive heightened scrutiny).
127 Varnum, 763 NW2d at 894-95.
128 908 A2d 196 (NJ 2006).
129 Id at 200 ("Although we cannot find that a fundamental right to same-sex marriage
exists in this State, the unequal dispensation of rights and benefits to committed same-sex partners can no longer be tolerated under our State Constitution.").
130 Id at 213. See also id at 213-16 (citing the development of these protections).
131 Id at 211.
132 Lewis, 908 A2d at 211 (emphasis added).
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however, have taken a decidedly opposite approach-using demonstrations of gay and lesbian political muscle as reason to avoid providing
extensive judicial scrutiny to laws discriminating against them.
1. Non-gay marriage cases prior to Lawrence.
It was a federal court that first raised the prospect that gays might
be too politically powerful to be viable candidates for heightened scrutiny. As noted above, most federal circuits decided the question of gay
and lesbian suspect status between Bowers and Lawrence and used the
precedent of Bowers as an indication that heightened scrutiny would be
inappropriate.' Even after Lawrence, federal courts still have referred
to these precedents to hold that the position of gays and lesbians in the
three-tiered scrutiny system has been established, notwithstanding the
fact that these cases relied on overturned precedent.'
The Ninth Circuit, however, did not rely solely on this logic. Instead, in the 1990 case of High Tech Gays v Defense Industry Security
Clearance Office," it became the first court in the nation to argue that

gays and lesbians ought not receive heightened scrutiny because of
their political accomplishments.136 The court explained that "legislatures have addressed and continue to address the discrimination suffered by homosexuals on account of their sexual orientation through
the passage of antidiscrimination legislation."".. In support of this
proposition, the court cited a smattering of gay rights legislation passed
across the country, including a comprehensive employment discrimination law in Wisconsin, an executive order barring discrimination in the
provision of state services in New York, a Michigan law outlawing discrimination in healthcare provision on the basis of sexual orientation,
and scattered city antidiscrimination regulations."" Of all the rules
cited by the court, only four-city ordinances in Seattle, Los Angeles,
and San Francisco, and a hate crimes law passed in California-were
even within the boundaries of the Ninth Circuit.139 Still, this was sufficient to show that "homosexuals are not without political power; they
have the ability to and do 'attract the attention of the lawmakers,' as
evidenced by such legislation."'" Hence, even those extremely limited
See Part II.B.
See Lofton v Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services, 358 F3d 804,
818 & n 16 (11th Cir 2004).
135 895 F2d 563 (9th Cir 1990).
136 Id at 573-74. The court also determined that homosexuality is not "immutable." Id at 573.
137 Id at 574.
138 Id at 574 n 10.
139 See High Tech Gays, 895 F2d at 574 n 10.
14 Id at 574.
133
13
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political victories were considered enough to push gays and lesbians
outside the realm of heightened scrutiny.
Six years later, Romer v Evans provided another opportunity for
courts to discuss the relative power of gays and lesbians. Justice Scalia's claim that the Colorado law was a rational decision by Colorado
voters to stem the endeavors of the politically powerful gay lobby has
already been discussed above."' It was the state trial court in Romer,'42
however, that, in determining whether gays and lesbians ought to receive suspect status,'43 took the argument a step further. Whereas the
court in High Tech Gays cited scattered legislative accomplishments
by the gay rights movement, the trial court in Romer reasoned that the
electoral fight over Amendment 2 "supports a finding of the political
power of gays and bisexuals."" "[M]ore than 46% of Coloradans voting
voted against Amendment 2. Testimony placed the percentage of homosexuals in our society at not more than 4%. If 4% of the population
gathers the support of an additional 42% of the population, that is a
demonstration of power, not powerlessness."45 Likewise, the court cited
the very city ordinances Amendment 2 overturned as further proof that
gays and lesbians possessed political power, or, at the very least, that
they were not "particularly politically vulnerable or powerless."'4 Once
again, absolute political powerlessness was the effective precondition
for receiving heightened scrutiny.
2. State gay marriage cases after Lawrence.
After Lawrence, courts began relying more heavily on political
power arguments. In contrast to the courts in Massachusetts, Iowa,
New Jersey, and California, Washington's high court used state enactments providing legal protections to gay and lesbian citizens as evidence that "as a class gay and lesbian persons are not powerless, but
instead, exercise increasing political power." 47 At the same time, the
See notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
Evans v Romer, 1993 WL 518586 (Colo Dist Ct).
143 This issue was not raised on appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court or the US Supreme
Court. See Evans v Romer, 882 P2d 1335, 1341 n 3 (Colo 1994) (declining to address whether
gays and lesbians are a suspect class, as the issue was not appealed); Romer, 517 US at 640 n 1
(Scalia dissenting) ("The trial court rejected respondents' argument that homosexuals constitute
a 'suspect' or 'quasi-suspect' class, and respondents elected not to appeal that ruling to the Supreme Court of Colorado.").
144 Evans, 1993 WL 518586 at *12.
145 Id.
146 Id ("Because the gay position has been defeated in certain elections, such as Amendment 2, does not mean gays are particularly politically vulnerable or powerless. It merely shows
that they lost that election. No adequate showing has been made of the political vulnerability or
powerlessness of gays.").
147 Andersen v King County, 138 P3d 963,975 (Wash 2006).
141

142
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court sought to distinguish other precedents that seemingly pointed
toward heightened protection. The court was able to dismiss several
such precedents because they interpreted distinct state constitutional
clauses, were reversed by higher courts, or spoke only in dicta.' 4 But
two cases (in Alaska and Hawaii) granting heightened protection to
gays and lesbians were distinctive because they were met with immediate popular rejection in the form of constitutional amendments.1 49
Even though the inability to defend favorable court rulings from constitutional reversal would seem to demonstrate a definitive lack of
political power by those states' gay communities, the Washington
court cited this repudiation as reason for not giving additional protections to gays and lesbians." The seeming implication was that both
popular favor and disdain for gay rights played against suspect classification as far as the Washington court was concerned.
The dissenters in the Washington case harshly criticized the majority's treatment of gay political power. First, they characterized the
rationale behind the anti-gay marriage statute as akin to how "antipapal laws once sought to 'defend' a protestant way of life from an
onslaught of Catholic immigrants, and segregation laws sought to 'defend' white-privilege from people of color""'5 -in other words, as part
of a long tradition of recasting discriminatory legislation as desperate
defenses by a besieged majority struggling against the political threat of
despised others.15 This fictive belief in the overwhelming political power
of gays, the dissent suggested, was itself indicative of prejudice."
Meanwhile, the vaunted victories of the gay rights movement cited by
the majority were narrowly decided and the product of a bitter, thirtyyear struggle; they were also national outliers.'" Finally, in Washington
and across the country, gays and lesbians were largely absent from
important political and judicial offices."'
The Maryland Court of Appeals (Maryland's highest court) also
relied explicitly on the political power argument in rejecting a gay
marriage challenge.' Maryland was somewhat unique in that it at
Id (distinguishing cases from California and Oregon).
See id, citing Brause v Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super Ct);
Baehr v Lewin, 852 P2d 44 (Hawaii 1993).
150 See Andersen, 138 P3d at 975.
151 Id at 1030 (Bridge dissenting).
152 Notice also the implicit rebuke to Justice Scalia's Romer and Lawrence dissents. See text
accompanying notes 88-91 and 98-103.
153 Andersen, 138 P3d at 1031 (Bridge dissenting) (arguing that laws rooted in this false
stereotype are "rooted in prejudice, not rationality").
154 Id.
155 Id at 1031-32 (noting only four openly gay legislators and no gay judges or executive officers in Washington and pointing to similarly lackluster representation in the federal government).
156 Conaway v Deane, 932 A2d 571,613 (Md 2007).
148
149
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least recognized the "irony" that the promotion of gay rights legislatively was hurting gays doctrinally in the judicial arena,' and the court
was explicit in holding that these advances were sufficient to render
irrelevant the sustained history of purposeful discrimination under
which the majority admitted gays and lesbians had suffered.' Like
Washington (and, for that matter, Iowa and its compatriots), the Maryland court was able to point to a significant number of political successes (both in terms of legislation and executive orders) won by the
gay rights movement.'59 In tandem with these, the court also cited favorable cases like Romer and a substantial number of Maryland family law decisions to demonstrate "[e]volutionary legal developments
highlighting changing views toward gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender persons.""0 But whereas states such as Iowa used these developments to hold that the state no longer could assert an interest in furthering anti-gay discrimination, Maryland instead characterized them as
proof of a "political coming of age."' It sided with Washington, viewing
these developments as signals that the courts should refrain from disturbing the democratic consensus in the state.
IV. POLITICAL POWER SHOULD PLAY A MINIMAL ROLE IN
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY ANALYSIS

The conflict outlined Part III is, at first blush, difficult to resolve
because both sides capture something intuitively compelling in their
arguments. On the one hand, it is certainly not implausible that suspect classification should eventually fall away as groups attain political
equality. The Rodriguez court, after all, labeled enhanced judicial inquiry "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
157 Id at 614 n 56 ("The irony is not lost on us that the increasing political and other successes
of the expression of gay power works against Appellees in this part of our analysis of the level of
scrutiny to be given the statute under review."). The court compounded this irony by citing, as part
of the evidence demonstrating gay political power and counseling against judicial intervention, a
student comment that used the increased equalization of the status of gays and lesbians to argue in
favor of judicial recognition of gay marriage. See id at 611 n 49, citing Gregory Care, Comment,

Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Long Overdue: The Evolution
of a "Sexual Orientation-Blind" System in Maryland and the Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage,

35 U Bait L Rev 73,75-92 (2005).
158 Conaway, 932 A2d at 611 ("In spite of the unequal treatment suffered possibly by Appellees and certainly a substantial portion of other citizens similarly situated, we are not persuaded that gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons are so politically powerless that they are entitled
to 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."').
159 Id.
16o Id at 612-13.
161 Id at 613. But see Andersen, 138 P3d at 1031 (Bridge dissenting) ("[A] limited number of
protective laws do not a powerful contingent make, particularly where they do not provide comprehensive equal rights.").
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process."6 Additional judicial protection is extraordinary; rational
basis review is ordinary. As groups proceed toward becoming normal
political interest groups on facially equal standing with their peers,
enhanced judicial protection should fall away. On the other hand, it is
ironic, to say the least, that judicial solicitude for minority claims
should contract precisely at the point where these groups begin gaining political traction.
This Part advances two arguments on this issue. First, whatever
the theoretical merits of the above positions, there is almost no evidence that the actual history of judicial behavior has been one in
which heightened protection is accorded only to absolutely marginalized groups. Indeed, much the opposite: groups that are absolutely
politically powerless typically are afforded little judicial solicitude.'
The groups that have received additional judicial protection have
done so only after gaining some measure of political influence.
Second, putting historical arguments aside, this Part argues that the
use of political power as a decisive factor gives unsympathetic judges
an opportunity to mask their prejudicial attitudes under the veneer of
legal doctrine. Focusing on the presence of poisonous discriminatory
attitudes directed toward a putatively vulnerable group-rather than
focusing on the measure of political power the group has attainedaligns better with our reasons for wanting courts to intervene in democratic processes.
2

A. Political Power Has Played Little Determinative Role in Judicial
Decisions to Either Grant or Withhold Heightened Scrutiny
If Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is primarily about protecting the powerless, judicial scrutiny ought to decline as political
power rises. Under this theory, because gays and lesbians are now sufficiently politically powerful, they missed the opportunity to attain
heightened scrutiny. Instead, the gay rights movement should have
launched its legal campaign against discrimination immediately in
tandem with the birth of the movement in 1969.'6 Unfortunately for
the theory, it did: the US Supreme Court actually decided a case in
1972, Baker v Nelson,'" challenging on equal protection and due
411 US at 28 (emphasis added).
See Conaway v Deane, 932 A2d 571,614 n 56 (Md 2007).
164 See Jack Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 Yale L J 2313, 2341 (1997) ("[Glroups
that are truly politically powerless usually do not even appear on the radar screen of legal decisionmakers-including courts-because the status hierarchy is so robust that few in power even
notice that there is a problem.").
165 See notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
166 409 US 810 (1972).
162
163
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process grounds the legality of excluding gays and lesbians from the
marriage institution. Specifically, the Supreme Court dismissed the
case in a single sentence: "Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn. dismissed for
want of substantial federal question."'67 In addition to demonstrating
what happens when litigants put their legal carts before their political
horses, Baker also raised a significant legal barrier to future gay rights
litigation because technically it constitutes a decision on the merits
and thus carries with it precedential value.
The lesson of Baker tracks the experience of other disadvantaged
groups, such as blacks and women, seeking judicial protection. In general, the judiciary tends to lag well behind the political branches in
protecting the rights of minority groups, playing, at best, a supporting
role.'o Jack Balkin described judges as akin to "place kickers" on a
football team (compared to legislative "linebackers"):
Most place kickers are pretty bad at making an open-field tackle
to stop a speedy running back returning a kickoff. But place
kickers can help pile on after the other players have tackled or
slowed down a runner. That is sometimes how I imagine courts
and their relationship to social change: They see the running back
lying on the ground, groaning under the weight of a huge pile of
linebackers. The judges say to themselves, "It's time for us to do
some justice!" and they throw themselves on the pile.1o
Far from being at the vanguard of social justice, "when it comes
to sensing large-scale changes in social attitudes and acting on them,
courts are often like the cuckolded husband in the French farce: always the last to know."' It is only after "a significant amount of
groundwork has already been prepared through political agitation,

Id at 810.
See Walker v State, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 98320, *4 (SD Miss) (noting that since such a
dismissal constitutes a judgment on the merits, lower courts must follow Baker's lead on the
propriety of such equal protection and due process claims "until the United States Supreme
Court makes a different pronouncement on the issues" that case decided).
169 See generally Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope (Chicago 2d ed 2008) (arguing that
judicial action against Jim Crow was a lagging indicator against increased black political power);
Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights (Oxford 2004) (same). For a contrary view
asserting that judges can and do act as vanguards for social change, see Paul Finkelman, Book
167

168

Review, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 Harv L Rev 973, 1008-10

(2005) (arguing that Brown was not a product of social forces but represented a bold step by the
court that overcame substantial social and legal pressures), reviewing Klarman, From Jim Crow;
Paul Finkelman, The Radicalism of Brown, 66 U Pitt L Rev 35, 38 (2004) (explaining "why Brown
was jurisprudentially and substantively radical and why its implications were truly revolutionary").
170 Jack Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us about Constitutional Theory, 90 Va L Rev 1537,
1549 (2004).
171 Id.
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direct action, and legislative reform" that courts intervene.' Where
there is no social support for protecting a given minority, it is unclear
why judges, who are part of that same society, should be expected to
consistently rise above the prejudices of their times.
This dynamic, recognized by the Iowa Supreme Court in Varnum,
has played out again and again across American history. There is a reason why in 1973 one gets a decision like Frontiero,'"while in 1873 one
gets profoundly prejudiced opinions like the concurrence in Bradwell v
Illinois, declaring women unfit for legal practice."' Likewise for the timing difference in Dred Scottm7 or Plessy v Ferguson7 compared to Brown
v Board of Education79 or Loving v Virginia." Courts respond to social
movements agitating for political change -they do not predate them.'.
Furthermore, the courts extend enhanced protection to groups
that by no measure could be said to be politically powerless, at least
compared to gays and lesbians.' As far as current federal doctrine is
concerned (echoed by many states), gays and lesbians receive less
judicial protection than do men,' whites,"' and illegitimate child4

172 Id at 1549-50. See also id at 1550 ("[C]ourts confirm what has already been happening
in the larger legal and political culture.").
173 See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L J 1346,
1404 (2006) (observing that "judicial review cannot do anything for the rights of the minority if
there is no support at all in the society for minority rights").
174 See text accompanying notes 122-127.
175 411 US at 685-88 & n 17 (plurality) (taking notice of statutory protections against sex
discrimination and observing that women did "not constitute a small and powerless minority" in
the course of invalidating a legislative classification discriminating against them).
176 83 US (16 Wall) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley concurring) (asserting that it was "the law of
the Creator" that the "paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother").
177 60 US (19 How) 393 (1857).
178 163 US 537 (1896).
179 347 US 483 (1954).

'

388 US 1 (1967).

See Balkin, 106 Yale L J at 2340 (cited in note 164) ("[L]egal elites ... usually respond to
'disadvantaged' groups only after a social movement has demanded a response. Ironically then, a
status group must display some degree of political power ... before it can be considered 'politically powerless' and hence deserving of legal protection.").
181

182 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court Politics, 23 L & Ineq 1,30-31 (2005):

Several ... courts have specifically held, pointing to scattered statutory enactments that
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, that gays and lesbians possess too much political
power to qualify as a suspect class. Yet the vast array of statutes that prohibit race and sex
discrimination also apply to white men, and courts, nevertheless, apply strict scrutiny to
their racial discrimination claims.
183 See Craig, 429 US at 204 (holding that laws discriminating against men warrant heightened scrutiny).
184 See Richmond v JA. Croson Co, 488 US 469, 493-96 (1989) (mandating strict scrutiny
for laws that discriminate against whites).
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ren.' To be sure, these groups typically gain such protections ancillary
to protection granted to less powerful peers with whom they share a
class. For example, whites receive strict scrutiny protection because
black political vulnerability is translated into class-based protection
from "racial" discrimination, not because whites themselves are seen
as politically powerless.' This demonstrates that the initial focus of
the doctrine is on groups, not classes: looking to whether race, or sex,
or poverty, or sexual orientation deserves heightened scrutiny means
looking at the disadvantaged contingent of those denominations to see
if they qualify."' The enhanced protection provided to privileged
groups such as whites is a logically unnecessary extra step, one that
undermines the notion that the judicial focus accords solely to the
politically powerless.
At the same time as they have been solidifying enhanced judicial
protection for the privileged counterparts of already protected groups,
courts have effectively frozen the list of new groups and classes to be
deemed worthy of suspect status-neither adding new groups recognized as being politically powerless nor subtracting those whose political fortunes have risen. Consequently, there is no reported case in which
a group that has at one point been classified as a suspect or quasisuspect class has subsequently lost that classification, notwithstanding
further advances in political potency.' This paralysis results from the
disjuncture between rhetoric and practice: the doctrine tells us that
more power should correlate with reduced protection, while the history indicates the reverse. In any event, this sort of judicial behavior
makes it difficult to hold that political powerlessness is a necessary
condition for receiving heightened scrutiny.

See Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762, 769 (1976) (applying heightened scrutiny to laws
classifying people based on their status as illegitimate children).
186 Though some commentators have strongly implied that whites are politically vulnerable.
Consider, for example, Abigail Thernstrom and Edward Blum, Do the Right Thing, Wall St J A10
(July 15, 2005) (asserting the Congress renewed the Voting Rights Act because representatives
were "terrified by" the political power of groups such as the NAACP).
185

187

See Ruth Colker, Anti-subordination above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61

NYU L Rev 1003, 1022 n 71 (1986) (observing that the Brown court reached its decision based
not on an abstract misuse of racial classifications, but by concretely focusing on the harms to
black children specifically); Richard Lempert, The Force of Irony: On the Morality of Affirmative

Action and United Steelworkers v.Weber, 95 Ethics 86, 89 (1984) ("[A] claim made by a white
person as a member of the dominant majority draws its moral force largely from our collective
horror at centuries of oppressing black people."). But note that strict scrutiny for whites was
established in Croson in 1989-well after blacks began enjoying strict scrutiny protection.
188

See Evan Gerstmann, The Constitutional Underclass: Gays Lesbians and the Failure of

Class-Based Equal Protection 24 (Chicago 1999) ("The list of protected classes has been in stasis
since [the mid-1970s].").
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Because of considerations like these, the Connecticut Supreme
Court decided that, at best, political powerlessness (along with immutability) are "subsidiary" to whether the group has faced a history of
discrimination and stereotyping unreflective of its ability to contribute
to society." Instead, the court simply observed that (1) gays and lesbians had less political power than do women and blacks today;
(2) heightened scrutiny was applied to whites and men, unquestionably nonmarginal groups; and (3) "when African-Americans and women first were recognized as suspect and quasi-suspect classes, respectively, comprehensive legislation barring discrimination against those
groups had been in effect for years [without] deter[ing] the United
States Supreme Court from according them protected status."'" Ultimately, the Connecticut court did not truly make a determination that
gays and lesbians met some threshold level of political powerlessness
so much as it observed that political powerlessness seemed to have no
dispositive effect in prior judicial determinations of suspect status.
B.

Demonstration of Political Power Should Have Minimal Probative
Value in Assessing Whether a Group Should Receive Increased
Judicial Protection

As a historical matter, (lack of) political power has played little
role in the allocation of suspect status, and the presence of political
power has not been a bar to receiving suspect status. Indeed, for the
most part courts have only been willing to subject discrimination
against marginal groups to close scrutiny when those groups had already demonstrated some political clout. At some level, this descriptive account itself is a strong warrant for the normative claim that the
courts should take little notice of a group's political power in their
heightened scrutiny analysis, to avoid imposing on courts an obligation they have proven themselves unable to meet and to avoid placing
litigants in a no-win situation in which past triumphs close more doors

189

See Kerrigan v Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A2d 407,427 (Conn 2008).

190 Id at 440-41. See also Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Height-

ened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 Colum L Rev 1753, 1806 (1996) ("Blacks are protected by three federal constitutional amendments, major federal Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, 1871, 1875 ...
1957, 1960, 1964, 1965, and 1968, as well as by antidiscrimination laws in 48 of the states."). It is
also worth noting that the definitive division between "gays and lesbians" and "person of color"
is itself representative of an inaccurate stereotype of gays and lesbians as predominantly white
and upper-class. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites"?: Race, Sexual
Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 Cornell L Rev 1358, 1372-74 (2000) ("[T]he narrow

racial and class construction of gays and lesbians in the anti-gay context appears in the 'special
rights' rhetoric, which anti-gay advocates employ to depict the gay and lesbian community as
affluent, well-educated, privileged, and, therefore, undeserving of civil rights protection.").
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than they open.'" The point is not to demand that courts vigorously
protect women's rights in 1873, or black rights in 1896, or gay rights in
1972; the historical inquiry demonstrates that this is unrealistic. This
Comment accepts that courts will not be vanguards. Once that acknowledgment is made, however, it no longer makes sense for courts
to rely on factors predicated on the notion that courts will be the first
progressive actors on the scene.
1. The focus on political power allows judges to rationalize
discriminatory attitudes.
Beyond historical observation, there are positive reasons for rejecting political powerlessness as a prerequisite for heightened scrutiny. A focus on whether putatively marginalized minorities have secured some political victories caters to cognitive instincts that act to
reinforce discriminatory systems. In a liberal polity, discrimination is
seen as wrong, and thus support for seemingly discriminatory or inegalitarian policies must be justified.' Gunner Myrdal described the
"American dilemma" as
the ever-raging conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations
preserved on the general plane which we call the "American
creed," where the American thinks, talks, and acts under the influence of high national and Christian precepts and, on the other
hand, the valuations on the specific planes of individual and
group living, where personal and local interests; economic, social,
and sexual jealousies; consideration of community prestige and
conformity; group prejudice against particular persons or types of
people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits
dominate his outlook.
The problem is that, faced with this dilemma, people seek to resolve the
cognitive dissonance by redefining the current state of affairs as just,
rather than challenging the underlying inequality.'" Even at the height
191For a fuller exploration of how past victories can act to block, rather than enable, future
successes, see generally David Schraub, Sticky Slopes (unpublished manuscript, 2010), online at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1506125 (visited Mar 29,2010).
192 See Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics
117 (Westminster 2002) (originally published 1932) ("Since inequalities of privilege are greater
than could possibly be defended rationally, the intelligence of privileged groups is usually applied to the task of inventing specious proofs for the theory that universal values spring from,
and that general interests are served by, the special privileges which they hold.").
193 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy
lxxix (Transaction 1996) (originally published 1944).
194 See Jon Hanson and Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame:Justifying (Racial) Injustice in
America, 41 Harv CR-CL L Rev 413, 419 (2006) ("[Pleople crave justice .... [Hiowever ... we
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of American racial apartheid, supporters of the system of white supremacy nonetheless sought to cast it as consistent with American norms
of equality.9 The conflict between discriminatory practices, on the one
hand, and people's desire to see themselves as egalitarian, on the other,
causes people to search persistently for ways to convince themselves
that their behavior is fair and not motivated by prejudice.9 Courts, as
members of society, are generally implicated in this unjust scheme and
thus have a psychological incentive to redefine it as justified.
One common way of reifying the justness of inequality is to recast the victims as truly advantaged-in possession of "special rights"
or great political influence. Any amount of political power or social
advancement can and has been taken to show that a group has attained
"equality" and thus does not require "special" legal protections." This is
amply demonstrated in the history of the gay rights movement. Recall
the High Tech Gays opinion, in which a handful of antidiscrimination
ordinances (many quite limited) scattered across the country was considered sufficient to label gays and lesbians political powerful."
Any evidence of gay political power can only be interpreted
against an implicit baseline of how much power that group "should"
possess-a determination that is necessarily subjective. Consequently,
"[c]ourts have used identical evidence regarding pro-gay legislation as
indicative of both gay power and powerlessness.""9 Because any expression of gay power will seem noteworthy and aberrant against a

often satisfy the craving through troubling means: when alleviating innocent suffering is at all
difficult or complex, people reconceive the victim as deserving the suffering by assigning negative characteristics to her.").
195 See Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter:A Play in Three Acts, 26 Cardozo L Rev
1689,1692 (2005) (noting that many "believed that Jim Crow was fully consistent with equality
and that to eliminate it would interfere with people's rights and liberties"); Randall Kennedy,
Marriage and the Struggle for Gay, Lesbian, and Black Liberation, 2005 Utah L Rev 781,790-91

("Many slaveholders sincerely believed that for Negroes, bondage was a positive good. Similarly,
many segregationists believed, honestly, that keeping blacks in their 'place' would redound to
their benefit as well as to the interests of white society.").
196 See John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions:
1989 and 1999, 11 Psych Sci 315, 317-18 (2000) (arguing that given a neutral cover for making a
decision, whites will overwhelmingly discriminate against blacks, whereas without such a cover
they will treat whites and blacks equally); John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gartner, Aversive
Racism, 36 Advances Exper Soc Psych 1, 3 (2004) (noting that the mechanisms behind aversive
racism do not necessarily restrict themselves to the American racial context).
197 See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 Wash U L Rev 917
(2009) (sourcing this argument to opponents of the original Reconstruction amendments and
tracing its deployment against virtually every piece of civil rights legislation ever proposed).
198 See 895 F2d at 574 n 10 (citing, among others, an antidiscrimination provision in Michigan that was limited to health care providers and several forward-looking city ordinances as
proof that gays and lesbians were political equals).
199 Yoshino, 96 Colum L Rev at 1805 (cited in note 190).
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backdrop of heterosexual normalcy," maintaining political power as a
barrier to judicial protection provides an easy psychological out for
legal policymakers who do not wish to grapple with the continued
effects of prejudice and inequality.
2. Opposing impermissible animus provides the strongest
warrant for judicial protection of minorities.
Because society will always try to reinterpret its unjust social practices as fair and appropriate, any effective judicial intervention scheme
must go straight to the source: the prejudice itself. This focus also attaches to the strongest elements of the CaroleneProducts framework.
Consider Bruce Ackerman's famous critique of the Carolene
Products'sFootnote Four. Ackerman observes that all three elements
of the "discrete and insular minorities" formulation either are boons in
a democratic system, or at the very least cannot be the basis for suspicion when they result in defeats. ' First, he argues that "minorities are
supposed to lose in a democratic system-even when they want very
much to win and even when they think (as they often will) that the
majority is deeply wrong in ignoring their just complaints."202 Even if
one thinks that minority groups should generally be able to secure their
ends (at least some of the time) through coalition dynamics, it is unclear
20

200 A DC district court judge, addressing the argument that gays and lesbians could not
"gain the attention of politicians," responded that "[o]ne need only remember St. Patrick's Day
1991 in New York City to see Mayor David Dinkins marching in the traditionally Irish-Catholic
parade with homosexual groups and activists who were important supporters during his tough
mayoral campaign." Steffan v Cheney, 780 F Supp 1, 8-9 (DDC 1991), affd, Steffan v Perry, 41
F3d 677 (DC Cir 1994) (en banc). In response, Kenji Yoshino observed that "[t]he court does not
ask why one can be expected to remember this event. Dinkins marching with the gays is memorable because it is the exception that proves the rule of politicians not wanting to support gays."
Yoshino, 96 Colum L Rev at 1806 (cited in note 190).
201 Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv L Rev 713,723-24 (1985):
Carolene is utterly wrongheaded in its diagnosis. Other things being equal, "discreteness and
insularity" will normally be a source of enormous bargaining advantage, not disadvantage, for
a group engaged in pluralist American politics. Except for special cases, the concerns that underlie Carolene should lead judges to protect groups that possess the opposite characteristics
from the ones Carolene emphasizes-groups that are "anonymous and diffuse" rather than
"discrete and insular." It is these groups that both political science and American history
indicate are systematically disadvantaged in a pluralist democracy.
202 Id at 719 (asserting that "absolutely central to democratic theory" is the observation that
minorities are supposed to lose-their recourse lies in influencing the majority). See also Holder
v Hall, 512 US 874,901 n 10 (1994) (Thomas concurring) ("[I]n a majoritarian system, numerical
minorities lose elections."); Waldron, 115 Yale L J at 1398 (cited in note 173) ("Peopleincluding members of topical minorities-do not necessarily have the rights they think they have.
They may be wrong about the rights they have; the majority may be right.").
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"why minorities may dress up these expectations in the language of
constitutional rights and demand judicial protection for them."20s
Discreteness and insularity, for their part, are both actually beneficial qualities in the democratic process. Drawing on public choice
literature, Ackerman notes that concentrated (insular) groups can
overcome collective action problems,"" have greater political influence
m This last attribute itself
in Congress,"' and are more easily organized.2
is assisted by discreteness (visibility), because a discrete group does
not have to induce its members to reveal their stigmatized attribute in
order to organize them.2 These arguments were later echoed in Justice Scalia's Romer dissent, in which the gay community's insularity,
relative affluence, and concentration were used to cast it as politically
quite potent.2

But recall why Carolene Products extended special protection to
these minority groups in the first place -because these groups may face
"prejudice . . . which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those

political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."m
Addressing the problem of prejudice, Ackerman retreats to a far more
modest claim-simply expressing skepticism that legislators will forgo
the opportunity to bargain with a potentially fruitful source of votes.210
This chink in the armor provides the point of counterattack. John
Hart Ely's famous defense of Carolene Products focuses primarily on
the need to provide open and equal democratic participation by invalidating laws that are indicative of procedural failures.n In defending
heightened scrutiny for vulnerable minorities, however, he implicitly
concedes that the worry is effectively substantive: laws singling out a
minority group likely stem from "a simple desire to disadvantage the
minority in question."1
Ackerman, 98 Harv L Rev at 720 (cited in note 201).
Id at 724-26 (citing the NAACP and Anti-Defamation League as examples of collective
action among minorities).
205 Id at 726-28 (emphasizing that insular groups are "more likely to form a political lobby
peopled by credible leaders who remain in close touch with the insular constituency they represent").
206 Id at 726.
207 Ackerman, 98 Harv L Rev at 730-31 (cited in note 201) (explaining that AfricanAmericans need not purposefully and deliberately reveal the attribute making them an insular
minority because it is apparent, unlike the case of gays, lesbians, or Jews).
208 See notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
209 Carolene Products, 304 US at 152-53 n 4.
210 Ackerman, 98 Harv L Rev at 732-35 (cited in note 201) (arguing that the "pariah model"
wherein political majorities simply refuse to work with minority groups is implausible in all but
the most extreme circumstances).
211 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust:A Theory ofJudicial Review 181 (Harvard 1980).
212 Id at 147. There is, as Charles Lawrence, III argues, no way around the fundamentally
substantive nature of the claim-courts protect minority groups because they have bought into a
substantive value judgment that discrimination against, and subordination of, those groups is
203
204
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In their own reconstruction of Carolene Products, Daniel Farber
and Phillip Frickey also use the angle of prejudice to critique Ackerman
on both theoretical and empirical grounds.13 Where there is an ideological preference for subordinating a certain group, it is quite possible that
prejudice can override normal democratic bargaining, because part of
what the legislator is attempting to achieve is the continued marginalization of the disfavored group.21 As Farber and Frickey put it, "part of
the 'political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities' may be a legislator's ideological commitment to fair treatment,
which may not extend to 'second-class citizens."'215 These prejudicial
attitudes can manifest without overt intention-indeed, where "a society has recently adopted a moral ethic that repudiates racial disadvantaging for its own sake, governmental decisionmakers are as likely to
repress their racial motives" as they are to simply lie about them after
the fact.21 Consequently, it makes more sense for courts to analyze allegedly inegalitarian actions with reference to the act's prejudicial "cultural meaning," rather than to look for explicit statements denying the
minority group the right to equal participation."
In normal democratic operations, discrete and insular minorities
should be quite capable of protecting their own interests; it is when
they cannot that we begin to search for some sort of failure. What
distinguishes groups worthy of heightened protection from normal
political losers is the existence of morally intolerable prejudice, which
blocks targeted groups from equal participation in the system of democratic bargaining. Where hostility to, and subordination of, a particular group is itself a popular and salient political goal, then judicial
scrutiny is warranted even if at times the marginalized group has managed to secure some legislative protections.218
morally intolerable. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy,
and Community (A Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 Yale

L J 1353, 1382-84 (2005) (asserting that Ely's theory has to be undergirded by a substantive
constitutional norm that certain groups cannot be subjected to social subordination).
213 See Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on
Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation,79 Cal L Rev 686,702-08 (1991).
214 See id at 702 ("The power a minority group can muster will be limited to the extent that
other voters (and legislators) are ideologically motivated to suppress it.").
215 Id, quoting Carolene Products, 304 US at 152-53 n 4.
216 Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan L Rev 317, 349 (1987).
217 See id at 355 (explicating the "cultural meaning" test as the proper standard for when
judicial actors ought to apply heightened scrutiny).
218 See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 153 (cited in note 211) (noting the possibility of
"attempts to inflict inequality for its own sake-to treat a group worse not in the service of some
overriding social goal but largely for the sake of simply disadvantaging its members"); Robert M.

Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 Yale L J 1287,1296-97

(1982) ("[O]rganized baiting of minorities has been one of the levers for manipulating masses
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CONCLUSION

Antidiscrimination law recognizes the existence of a problem, not
its solution.2 This Comment does not make the idealistic demand that
courts be the first responders for politically marginalized groups.22 It
merely asks them to abandon doctrinal standards that presuppose that
they do play this role-standards whose malleability and inconsistent
application have caused the law surrounding gay rights to dissolve
into virtual incoherency. Given courts' unwillingness to entertain
claims made by marginalized minorities until they flash some political
power, the ability to get an antidiscrimination law passed should not
be taken as sufficient proof that the problem of discrimination has
been resolved. Eliminating (or at least greatly reducing) the courts'
inquiry into whether a group is politically powerless, and replacing it
with a focus on the prejudice and animus directed at that group, both
better matches the historical treatment of judicial protection of minority groups and provides a normatively superior account of how the
court should mete out such protection.

since the advent of modern politics. It represents, thus, a failure of politics not only in the nonprotection of the victim group, but also in the deflection and perversion of other public purposes."). This helps distinguish groups like gays, or blacks, or women from other groups that face
negative stereotyping but seem to be inappropriate candidates for heightened judicial review.
There are stereotypes that blondes are dumb, or that landlords are greedy, for example, but there
is no political constituency that seems to view punishing or restricting the rights of blondes or
landlords as an inherent social good in the same way that those views have historically manifested against gays, racial minorities, and women.
219 See Hernandez v Robles, 855 NE2d 1,28 (NY 2006) (Kaye dissenting) ("[Antidiscrimination]
measures acknowledge-rather than mark the end of-a history of purposeful discrimination.").
220 Though, once again, if courts want to break from the historical trend and take on that
role, they are most welcome to do so. See note 4.
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